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Split Loyalty: An Ethical Problem for the
Criminal Defense Lawyer
Gerald S. Gold*
N OWHERE IN LAW do ethical considerations play a greater part
or come into greater conflict than in the defense of those
accused of crime. The lawyer defending an accused owes a duty
to his client, a duty to society, and a duty to the court. The
duties to each are not completely clear and when the various
loyalties conflict, fair, safe, and moral resolutions are most diffi-
cult.
The Duty to the Client
Probably the most quoted overstatement of fidelity to one's
client is found in Lord Brougham's argument concerning the
defense of Queen Caroline:
. . . that an advocate by the sacred duty which he owes his
client knows in the discharge of that office but one person in
the world, that client and none other. To save that client, by
all expedient means, to protect that client at all hazards and
costs to all others, and among others to himself, is the high-
est and the most unquestioned of his duties. And he must
not regard the alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruc-
tion which he may bring upon others.'
It appears that this was not in the mainstream of English
thinking even in 1846. Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, speaking
to an audience which included Lord Brougham said that in car-
rying out the interests of his client the fearless advocate should
wield the "arms of a warrior and not of the assassin." 2 The his-
tory books do not record whether the learned Chief Justice di-
rected any of his remarks toward the chair occupied by Lord
Brougham.
The relationship of the accused and his counsel, which de-
mands at least some of the loyalty called for by Brougham, is the
same whether the attorney is retained by the client or assigned
by the court. The confidential relationship begins as soon as the
* Attorney-in-Charge, Defender's Office, Cleveland (Ohio) Legal Aid
Society.
1 C. C. Savage, Q. C., The Duties and Conduct of Crown and Defense Coun-
sel in a Criminal Trial, 1 Crim. L. Q. 164 (1914).
2 Denning, Road to Justice, 39 (1914).
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attorney confers with the accused (even prior to being retained)
and continues after the final disposition of the case.
3
The first ethical consideration of counsel is whether he
should accept the case. A lawyer is under no legal duty to ac-
cept a criminal retainer nor will he by such denial violate any
ethical canon.4 The Canon of Professional Ethics (Number 5)
provides:
It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense of
a person accused of crime, regardless of his personal opinion
as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent persons,
victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be denied
proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the lawyer
is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present every
defense that the law of the land permits, to the end that no
person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process
of law.
In the opinion of Edward Bennett Williams, whose experi-
ence in criminal cases has been considerable, "Moral judgments
by the lawyer are frequently wrong and he learns not to make
them." 5 There is also the right to accept cases wherein the client
admits his guilt and cases in which counsel thinks that the client
is guilty. If a lawyer has decided to represent only those whom
he believes innocent he must not interview an accused without
disclosing this factor.6 Once counsel has accepted a case he
should have resolved his own moral conflicts and determined to
follow the case through. If moral qualms exist he should not
3 Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association:
Confidences of a Client,
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This
duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his em-
ployees; and neither of them should accept employment which involves
or may involve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the
private advantage of the lawyer, of his employees or to the disadvan-
tage of the client, without his knowledge and consent, and even though
there are other available sources of such information. A lawyer should
not continue employment when he discovers that this obligation pre-
vents the performance of his full duty to his former or to his new
client.
4 Warvelle, Legal Ethics 141 (1902). But see, Canon 4:
When Counsel for an Indigent Prisoner,
A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not to
ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert his
best efforts in his behalf.
5 Williams, One Man's Freedom 27 (1962).
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accept the case. Taking on a criminal case, like getting married,
is "for better or for worse." In a criminal case as in marriage
there are reasons for breaking the relationship. But, one of them
is not simply that the lawyer later learns that his client is prob-
ably guilty. That consideration does not extinguish the role of
the advocate.
A practical example may illuminate problems which develop
once the case has been accepted. Suppose that a client confesses
to counsel that he committed the precise crime charged. Counsel
follows his professional duty to advise the client that perhaps a
plea to a lesser offense or even to the offense charged might
mitigate in his favor. The client, however, untutored in law
school, but well schooled in the jail house, tells the lawyer, "Let's
make them prove it." The duty of the advocate is to follow his
client's wishes in this case since the desire expressed parallels his
rights guaranteed by law. The advocate must exercise compe-
tence, zeal and ability to take advantage of any and all legal de-
fenses in properly representing his client. If the client later dem-
onstrates to a reviewing court that such was not done, a new
trial will be ordered because of incompetent counsel.7  Some
lawyers who have either a limited criminal practice or none at
all feel that a successful endeavor on behalf of a guilty client is
something to be decried. Many attorneys in the practice of crim-
inal law avoid the moral issue with the argument that the de-
fense lawyer does not know whether his client is guilty or inno-
cent until determined by a judge or jury. This, I feel is a seman-
tic rationalization. There are many cases when a lawyer does
know. "It is not the lawyer but the law that does not know
whether his case is good or bad. The law does not know because
it is trying to find out and so the law wants everyone defended
and every debatable case tried. Therefore, the law makes it easy
for a lawyer to take a case, whether or not he thinks it bad.. ." 8
Yet, while the law makes it easy for the attorney to accept
a client whom he believes guilty, it does not make it easy for the
lawyer to advocate his client's cause which the law requires him
7 E.g., People v. Ibarra, 30 Cal. Rptr. 223 (D. C. App. 1963) (failure to object
to illegally obtained evidence); MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F. 2d 392 (5th Cir.
1960) (failure to properly notify and serve alibi witnesses); Sanchez v. State,
199 Ind. 235, 157 N. E. 1 (1927) (failure to properly investigate). See Waltz,
Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Convic-
tion Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 N.W.U.L. Rev. 3. (1964).
8 C. P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 3, 14 (1951).
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to do by all honorable means. To some extent the Canons of
Professional Ethics mitigate this problem by providing that it is
improper for counsel to assert his personal belief in his client's
innocence or the justice of his cause.9 As Mr. Curtis of the Bos-
ton Bar stated:
It is called improper just so that the lawyer may feel
that he does not have to. This I think, must be its only pur-
pose, for it is honored in no other way.'0
When an innocent man is convicted, a tragic error has oc-
curred. When a guilty man is acquitted the error is no less
tragic, only less grievous. It is for this reason that guilt must be
satisfactorily proved, "otherwise, innocent persons, victims of
suspicious circumstances might suffer." 11 It is also for this rea-
son that the law imposes a strict duty of advocacy upon the law-
yer and forbids him to prejudge his client's cause.
Although a client cannot control the manner in which his
attorney conducts the trial,'12 if the client desires to testify it is
most difficult practically, as well as constitutionally, to prevent
him from doing so. Let us suppose that the "make-em-prove-it"
client insists on taking the witness stand in his own defense after
hearing the prosecution's case. Counsel has done everything in
his power to advise against it.13 The accused then begins to nar-
rate a tale completely different from that previously told and in-
consistent with facts which his counsel has discovered by inves-
tigation. In short, he lies. What is the proper course for counsel
at this point? The alternatives which suggest themselves are:
1. Immediate disclosure to the court, or 2. immediate with-
drawal from the case.
Canon 2214 provides that the conduct of the lawyer before
the court should be characterized by candor and fairness. There
9 Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 15.
10 Curtis, op. cit. supra, n. 8 at 15.
11 Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 5.
12 Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 24.
13 Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 16:
Restraining Clients from Improprieties,
A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his
clients from doing those things which the lawyer himself ought not to
do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards Courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrong
doing the lawyer should terminate their relation.
14 Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association.
Jan., 1965
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are instances where affirmative disclosures should be made.
Attorneys have been suspended or disbarred for failing to dis-
close the whereabouts of clients who have jumped bail,15 the
presence of two friends on the jury panel' and the fact that a
client's mother had known and talked with a petit juror.'17 It
has been held unethical not to disclose that the corporate em-
ployer of a petit juror was a corporate relative of the defendant
corporation.' In re Schapiro,l9 a doctor testified that he had no
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. Counsel for plain-
tiff knew that the witness had a contingent fee agreement and
failed to disclose it to the court. It was held that the attorney's
failure to disclose the bias of the witness was improper.
Despite these cases which exact a high degree of candor by
the lawyer to the court, I have been unable to find a case in
which a defense lawyer in a criminal trial has been required to
disclose his client's lack of veracity or that of any other witness.
Moral backing for the non-necessity of disclosure is provided by
Father Connell:
If a witness for the defense without the foreknowledge
or connivance of the lawyer gives false testimony, the law-
yer has no obligation to point out the perjury.2 0
The basis of the attorney-client privilege is to allow freedom
of communication between client and attorney. The limitations
of the privilege include prospective crimes but not past crimes.21
Public safety demands the former but the proper administration
of justice denies the latter. Nowhere can justification be found
for a breach of the privilege by affirmative disclosure under the
above circumstances. The argument that the patent perjury is
a prospective crime seems to be a tortured extension of the ex-
ception to the privilege. 22 The practical effect of an affirmative
15 In re McCullough, 97 Utah 533, 95 P. 2d 13 (1939).
16 In re Shon, 28 N.Y.S. 2d 872, 39 N.E. 2d 310 (1941).
17 U. S. v. Henson, 179 F. Supp. 474 (D.D.C. 1959).
18 Op. 217, Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Asso-
ciation of the Bar of the City of New York and the New York County Law-
yers Association (1957).
19 144 App. Div. 1, 128 N. Y. S. 852 (1911).
20 Connell, Morals in Politics and Professions 112 (1951).
21 97 C.J.S. § 285.
22 Stovall, Aspects of the Advocate's Dual Responsibility, 22 Ala. Law. 62,
72 (1961).
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disclosure must be a mistrial. It will result in a second trial at
best and double jeopardy at worst.2 3 The lawyer who makes such
a disclosure because of his own deep moral feelings and profes-
sional integrity may well find that the very court he sought to
protect from fraud is extremely disturbed by his well-intentioned
but misguided candor.
Many civil lawyers looking from afar (if not down) upon
the criminal trial procedure, view withdrawal from the proceed-
ing as a necessary and proper escape valve for many kinds of
ethical breaches by clients or clients' witnesses.2 4 A former
president of the American Bar Association stated rather strong-
ly:
I think that if a lawyer thinks that his client or a
witness is not telling the truth he should not be a party to
what he believes to be a perjury and should not be a party
to polluting our courts of justice with this poison ... 25
Withdrawal may be a balm to the conscience of the lawyer
but presents difficult problems for the court. A mid-trial with-
drawal would certainly demand the declaration of a mistrial. A
devious defendant seeing the evidence mount against him might
purposely create a withdrawal situation for his own purposes.
On a second trial after the withdrawal, former jeopardy may be
a valid defense since the case had started and the mistrial de-
clared without provable fault of the defendant.2 6 A very prac-
tical difficulty with withdrawing from a matter during trial is
that by reason of the possible legal pitfalls as well as the desire
23 The very fact of disclosure to authority would so prejudice the case
against the defendant in a future as well as the present trial that it would
seem that even if the technical aspects of former jeopardy did not apply,
the due process law requirement of the United States Constitution would
prevent a second trial.
24 Op. No. 287 of The Committee on Legal Ethics and Grievances of the
American Bar Association. But see, Drinker, Some Remarks on Mr. Curtis'
"The Ethics of Advocacy," 4 Stan. L. Rev. 349 (1952). Mr. Drinker, the
author of Op. No. 287, while strongly opposing Mr. Curtis' emphatic client
loyalty (even to the extent of lying), fortunately recognized the necessity
of counsel to represent those accused of even the most outrageous acts. Mr.
Drinker quotes Baron Bramwell's report of a client stating to his lawyer,
"I want your advocacy, not your judgment." Op. No. 287 in practice makes
the lawyer a judge of his client rather than his advocate.
25 Buckner, The Trial of Cases, 15 A.BA.J. 271 (1929).
26 Since the lawyer is bound by the privilege, he cannot tell the precise
reason for withdrawal if it involves confidential communication. It is his
opinion that the client's insistence on a course of immoral conduct requires
withdrawal. Whether counsel's opinion outweighs a defendant's right to be
tried once for one crime seems to be constitutionally doubtful.
Jan., 1965
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for orderly administration of criminal justice most judges will
not allow it.
27
A good method of avoiding the problem is by explaining to
the active accused that his right to testify does not include a
right to perjury and if his testimony is not nearly identical to his
oft-repeated story, counsel will not comment in his final argu-
ment about the defendant's testimony. If this tactic does not
prevent the problem from arising and the client insists on taking
the stand and reciting a revised story, the lawyer, by refraining
from comment on this testimony in final argument, maintains his
duty as his client's advocate to "make them prove a case against
his client," but does not become an accessory after the fact to his
client's perjury.
The reader will please note that the given factual hypoth-
esis is one in which the counsel is convinced of his client's pre-
varication by uncontroverted facts. If counsel's opinion of guilt
is based upon the improbability of the defendant's testimony
coupled with seeming strength of the prosecution's case any act
other than complete advocacy of his client's cause would be
grossly improper.
Duty to Others
Attorneys although attempting to be objective cannot help
but form moral judgments as to the guilt or innocence of their
clients. After a number of personal conferences with his client
the attorney has formed a personal opinion that his client com-
mitted the act charged. The client furnishes counsel the names
of certain alibi witnesses. After talking with the witnesses the
attorney is convinced that the witnesses are either lying or mis-
taken. Experience shows that mothers, fathers, husbands, wives
and friends will furnish alibis for their dear ones because of love,
fear, mistaken belief in their innocence, or because it happens to
be true. Many of these people have had no contact with law or
law enforcement. What is the duty, if any, of the defense counsel
toward them? Should counsel advise the witness that he does
not believe him? Should counsel advise the witness of the pen-
27 Canon 44 provides that if the client "insists upon an unjust or immoral
course in the conduct of his case, or if he persists over the attorney's re-
monstrance in the presenting of frivolous defenses . . .the lawyer may be
warranted in the withdrawing on due notice to the client allowing him time
to employ another lawyer." (Emphasis supplied.) Quaere: once the crim-
inal trial has commenced is "due notice" possible?
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1965
14 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
alty for perjury? The spectacle of aged parents furnishing a per-
jured alibi for their oft-convicted son who was caught by the
police moments after the offense haunts the kind-hearted defense
lawyer.
Conversely, what if the defense counsel has formed the sub-
jective opinion that his client is innocent but finds alibi witnesses
mistaken as to times and dates and reluctant to testify, does he
express his opinion as to the innocence of his client and "re-
fresh" the witnesses memories? Witnesses should be inter-
viewed but not taught to parrot the defendant's story. Witnesses
may be coached but not suborned. The dividing line is thin and
only one's own moral integrity can mark it.
The unfortunate spectacle of having parents perjure them-
selves for a guilty son with false alibi testimony, or of seeing a
man, believed by his lawyer to be innocent, found guilty because
of the inability of witnesses to remember, sorely tempts the law-
yer to overreach his role of advocacy and express his personal
convictions as an individual regarding the justice of his client's
cause. If a lawyer does this he has gone too far.
The advocate has ceased to advocate and has now become
the moral as well as legal judge of his client. Personal opinions
as the justness or unjustness of a client's case cannot be reflected
in actions of the advocate toward others. Belief in a client's
cause should not be so overwhelming that the lawyer's enthu-
siasm creates witnesses rather than questions them. Nor should
disbelief or lack of enthusiasm be such as will discourage pos-
sible witnesses from testifying for a defendant.
A related problem occurs when a witness by his testimony
can aid the client but must incriminate himself. The witness
does not realize this. Should counsel for the accused inform the
witness of his right to refrain from testifying?
An advocate can represent only one interest. The duty to
the client is controlling. One must act with complete objectivity
as an advocate for his client without compassion for individuals
whose aid to the accused may be most costly to themselves. He
must leave informing the witness to his adversary or to the court.
As Williston quotes:
But at best there must be many things in the profession
from which a very sensitive conscience would recoil and
things must be said and done which can hardly be justified
except on the ground that the existence of a profession and
Jan., 1965
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the prescribed methods of its action are in the long run in-
dispensable to the honest administration of justice. "
Personal opinions are unwanted luxuries in the arsenal of
the advocate. A vigorous but not overzealous assertion of the
righteousness of his client's cause is the obligation of every ad-
vocate. Disbelief and defeatism deny the defendant the right to
effective counsel.
Duty to the Court
Canon 37 provides that it is the duty of a lawyer to pre-
serve his client's confidences, which duty outlasts the lawyer's
employment. When the rule first appeared, it was apparently
based on a consideration for the oath and honor of the lawyer
rather than for the apprehension of the client, but later and in
more modern times it was based on the principle that "in order
to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients,
the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers
must be removed." 29 The confidence must be preserved because
worse mischiefs might result from permitting disclosure than
from rejecting evidence of it.30
Canon 22 demands fairness and candor of the lawyer when
dealing with the court.
Canon 37, prescribing the lawyer's duty to preserve his cli-
ent's confidences, and Canon 22, prescribing the lawyer's duty of
candor to the court, directly conflict in the following hypothetical
situations:
1. A convicted client stands before the judge for the
sentence. The custodian of criminal records indicates to the
court that the defendant has no record. The court there-
upon says to the defendant, "You have no criminal record,
so I will put you on probation."
Defense counsel knows by independent investigation or
from his client that his client in fact has a criminal record
and that the record clerk's information is incorrect. Is it
the duty of defense counsel to disclose to the court the true
facts as to his client's criminal record?
28 Williston, Law and Life 272 (1940), (quoting from Lecky, The Map of
Life).
29 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2291 (3rd ed., 1940). See also Greenough v. Gas-
kell, 1 Myl. § K. 98, 103 (1833).
80 This is not merely a rule of professional conduct.
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2. Suppose, under the above circumstances, that the judge
before disposing of the case asks the defendant himself
whether he has a criminal record and the defendant answers
that he has none. Is it the duty of defense counsel to dis-
close to the court the true facts as to his client's criminal
record?
3. Assume further a situation in which the judge following
the conviction asks the defendant's lawyer whether his client
has a criminal record.3 1
A majority of the members of the American Bar Association
Ethics Committee decided as follows:
If the court asks the defendant whether he has a crim-
inal record and he answers that he has none, this, although
perhaps not technical perjury, for the purposes of the present
question amounts to the same thing. Despite this, we do not
believe the lawyer justified in violating his obligation under
Canon 37. He should, in due course, endeavor to persuade
the client to tell the court the truth and if he refuses to do
so should sever his relations with the client, but should not
violate the client's confidence. We yield to none in our in-
sistence on the lawyer's loyalty to the court of which he is
an officer. Such loyalty does not, however, consist merely
in respect for the judicial office and candor and frankness to
the judge. It involves also the steadfast maintenance of the
principles which the courts themselves have evolved for the
effective administration of justice, one of the most firmly
established of which is the preservation undisclosed of the
confidences communicated by his clients to the lawyer in his
professional capacity.
If the fact of the client's criminal record was learned by
the lawyer without communication confidential or otherwise,
from his client, or on behalf of him, Canon 37 would not be
applicable, and the only problem would be as to the con-
flicting loyalties of the lawyer on the one hand to represent
his client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets (Canon 6), and on the other to treat the court in
every case in which he appears as counsel, with the candor
and fairness (Canon 22) which the court has the right to
expect of him as its officer. In this case we deem the follow-
ing considerations applicable.
If the court asks the lawyer whether the clerk's state-
ment is correct, the lawyer is not bound by fidelity to the
client to tell the court what he knows to be an untruth, and
should ask the court to excuse him from answering the
31 Op. 287, Committee on Legal Ethics and Grievances (1953).
Jan., 1965
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question, and retire from the case, though this would doubt-
less put the court on further inquiry as to the truth.
Even, however, if the court does not directly ask the
lawyer this question, such an inquiry may well be implied
from the circumstances, including the lawyer's previous re-
lations with the court. The situation is analogous to that
discussed in our Opinion 280 where counsel knows of an
essential decision not cited by his opponent and where his
silence might reasonably be regarded by the court as an
implied representation by him that he knew of no such
authority. If, under all the circumstances, the lawyer be-
lieves that the court relies on him as corroborating the cor-
rectness of the statement by the clerk or by the client that
the client has no criminal record, the lawyer's duty of can-
dor and fairness to the court requires him, in our opinion, to
advise the court not to rely on counsel's personal knowledge
as to the facts of the client's record. While doubtless a client
who would permit the court, because of misinformation, to
be unduly lenient to him would be indignant when his law-
yer volunteered to ruin his chance of escaping a jail sen-
tence, such indignation would be unjustified since the client's
bad faith had made the lawyer's action necessary. The in-
dignation of the court, however, on learning that the lawyer
had deliberately permitted him, where no privileged com-
munication is involved, to rely on what the lawyer knew to
be a misapprehension of the true facts, would be something
that the lawyer could not appease on the basis of loyalty to
this client. No client may demand or expect of his lawyer,
in the furtherance of his cause, disloyalty to the law whose
minister he is (Canon 32), or "any manner of fraud or
chicane." (Canon 15).
If the lawyer is quite clear that the court does not rely
on him as corroborating, by his silence, the statement of the
clerk or of his client, the lawyer is not, in our opinion,
bound to speak out.
3 2
The opinion of the Committee fails to consider a most im-
portant factor. The Judge has asked an improper question, one
in disregard of the lawyer's role as an advocate. The actions
prescribed in the opinion, although certainly in keeping with the
dignity of the profession, have the same practical effect on the
disposition of the case as an affirmative disclosure of the infor-
mation. Experience shows that an attempt to distinguish com-
munications of a client and information independently learned is
both difficult and unrealistic. Even if the client did not tell his
32 Ibld.
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lawyer of his prior record, he undoubtedly told him confidential
facts about himself which placed the attorney in a better position
to learn of the past record than the authorities.
33
Any question asked of a lawyer by a judge which calls for
a possible breach of the confidential relationship is dangerous.
Questions calling for a moral opinion of one's own client are
equally perilous. Do you (the lawyer) think I should put him
on probation?
At no time during the existence of the attorney-client rela-
tionship must the lawyer state his personal opinion as to the just-
ness or unjustness of his client's cause. 34
Sentence time should not change the advocate into an assist-
ant judge. Even at this stage of the proceedings, "His (the law-
yer's) loyalty runs to his client. He has no other master. Not
the court? You ask ... No, in a paradoxical way. The lawyer's
official duty, required of him indeed by the court is to devote
himself to the client. The court comes second by the court's,
that is the law's own command." 35
The questioning at the bench is often rhetorical. The judge
does not expect the lawyer to deny his client's eligibility for
probation or a mitigated sentence when standing beside him in
open court. The more serious problem arises when a sincere
judge wishing to share in the experience and judgment of a fel-
low lawyer asks the advocate in the absence of his client what
he thinks the court should do with the defendant. The lawyer
knows that his unsworn statements to a judge or a fellow lawyer
differ from advocacy before a jury. Much of a lawyer's reputa-
tion in the legal community is based upon the integrity of his
word.
In the above situation for reasons of expediency the lawyer
usually leans on his duty of candor to the court rather than on
his duty of undivided loyalty to the client. Canon 22 prevails
over all others not because it offers the highest moral solution,
but because it is practical. The lawyer knows that he will ap-
33 The distinction between independent fact finding and privileged com-
munication could very well make a client wary as to what the lawyer may
discover and he therefore conceals facts which his counsel should know.
Such a distinction would seem to thwart the purpose of the privilege.
84 Canons of Professional Ethics, No. 15.
35 Curtis, op. cit. supra, n. 8, at 3.
Jan., 1965
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pear before the judge or his associates many times. The discov-
ery of an error which could have been prevented by candid
counsel can injure the reputation of the less than candid one
among the judiciary. This pragmatic control factor can operate
not only when the court directly asks a question but at any time
that the lawyer knows something that a sentencing judge should
know. In most metropolitan areas, judges are furnished thorough
presentence reports. The reports are not always correct. Many
serious misdemeanors and most less serious are disposed of with-
out presentence reports and often with meager criminal record
reports. The judge is then poorly informed and must in part rely
upon counsel. The lawyer seeking to be both an advocate for his
client and at the same time, fair and candid with the court, faces
a true dilemma.
One answer is client control. If the client has faith in his
lawyer he will follow his advice and be truthful. However, some
of the people accused of crime are criminals. They are anti-
social and demand every "break" they can get. Candid counsel
may soon be "canned" counsel. Client control is more difficult
for appointed counsel because of a basic mistrust of the "state"
or "free" lawyer. Even the most faithful client will be perplexed
by his own lawyer's presentation of adverse information to the
court and will wonder "who's side he is on."
Avoidance of the enforced pragmatic candor of answering
the court's improper questions and the forced volunteering of
information detrimental to a client's cause is necessary to con-
tinue the adversary system in the administration of criminal jus-
tice. Any affirmative statement offered by the advocate to the
court regarding sentence should be fair and truthful, but the fail-
ure of counsel to mention detrimental information violative of the
privilege cannot be held against the lawyer. Silence, too, can be
candid. If an error is later discovered blame need not be placed
on the silence of the lawyer but rather on the system which
erred. The adversary system does not conclude with conviction.
The prosecution, too, has a responsibility in the sentencing pro-
cedure. Abdication of that responsibility does not place the sole
duty of informing the court of pertinent facts on the defense
counsel. Judges should be able to rely upon the word of counsel
but not upon what an advocate does not and cannot say.
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Conclusion
This above all: to thine own self be true and it must




Understanding the ethical principles of the defense advocate
enables a lawyer to be true to himself and yet ably represent
one accused of even the most outrageous acts. If a lawyer cannot
accept these ancient principles he should avoid the vital, living
excitement of the criminal trial.
The loyalty which a criminal defense lawyer owes his client
is limited but undivided. Loyalty does not replace the lawyer's
conscience with that of his client and does not allow the use of
illegal or unethical means to achieve his goals.
The advocate is not the moral or legal judge of his client.
It is not the defense lawyer's duty to guarantee that the guilty
do not go free or that sufficient punishment is accorded the con-
victed. His duty as an officer of the court and as a member of
an honorable profession is met when he represents his client with
zeal, competence, loyalty and professional integrity. Nothing
more, is, nor should be required.
36 Shakespeare, Hamlet (Act. I, Scene I).
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